In an adverse selection model of a securities market with one informed trader and several liquidity traders, we study the implications of the assumption that the informed trader has more information on Monday than on other days. We examine the interday variations in volume, variance, and adverse selection costs, and find that on Monday the trading costs and the variance ofprice changes are highest, and the volume is lower than on Tuesday. These effects are strongerforfirms with better public reporting and for firms with more discretionary liquidity trading.
In a securities market in which there are differentially informed traders, market makers must cover their losses from transactions with informed traders by charging a spread from all traders. Bagehot (1971) In Section 2, we consider the effect of giving some liquidity traders discretion to delay their trades for one day without cost, so that they can avoid trading when the adverse selection problem is most severe. We show that without public information, the informed trader acts so as to keep constant the trading costs of these discretionary liquidity traders (the costs are proportional to the market depth or market maker's price response to new orders), rendering their delay tactics futile. However, when some information is revealed publicly, the informed trader's optimal strategy no longer equalizes the costs of trading for the liquidity traders through the week. While the equilibrium trading pattern depends on the number of discretionary liquidity traders and the quality of public information, we show that there are always higher trading costs and lower volume on Monday relative to Tuesday. Because we allow the discretionary liquidity traders to postpone their trades by only one day, we find that with precise public information, the equilibrium trading pattern has two days of concentrated trading each week; with poor public information there is only one day of concentrated trading each week. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) consider a model with many informed traders, in which all private information becomes public at the end of the trading session; they find, in contrast to our model, a single period of trade concentration.
We examine some alternate specifications of the model in Section 3 of the article, and present our conclusions in Section 4. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The Basic Model

Model description Consider a single asset that trades in a continuous auction market that is open five days a week and is closed on weekends and at night. The day of the week is denoted by d, where d = 1 is a Monday, so that the market is open on days 1 through 5. On each trading day, the market is open from time t = 0 to time t = 1.
The first market participant is the market maker who observes the order flow and sets prices. The second is an informed trader who has private information about the asset's value.2 Finally, there are many liquidity traders who face liquidity shocks and trade at the market price when the shocks occur. All traders are assumed to be risk neutral.
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Information about the asset's payoff enters the model from a public source or from a private signal observed by the informed trader. Public information is available in two ways: first, at the close of trading each day there is a noisy signal of the asset's payoff; and, second, every calendar quarter the asset's payoff is announced at the end of the day's trading. Immediately after the quarterly announcement, the payoff is distributed to the investors as a dividend. We refer to the joint event of the quarterly announcement and dividend as the quarterly report. We assume that the unconditional expected value of the asset's payoff is zero.
Each day (before t = 0 on trading days) the informed trader receives a signal, Vd, of the asset's payoff next quarter. The expected value of the asset's payoff given all past information, including the private signal, is Vd. At the time of the quarterly report, there is no information asymmetry and the expected payoff for the next quarter is zero. Hence, Vd is also the liquidation value of the asset if the informed trader's knowledge were made public. Vd 
where 'Yd is the noise that distinguishes the public signal from the informed trader's valuation. Yd is an independent, normally distributed shock with mean zero and variance o-2. The daily signal is distinct from the quarterly report. Let xdt denote the holdings of the asset by the informed trader. Then the instantaneous market order (purchases or sales) is denoted by dxdt. We assume that just prior to the quarterly report, the informed trader places an order so that she does not hold any of the asset when the quarterly report is announced.4
Liquidity traders enter the market continuously during the day and transact at the prevailing market price. Define their holdings of the asset by 1d,t Then the instantaneous net purchases or sales are denoted by dld, t= o dw, 
where Qd,t-represents the market information just before the instant t. 
where fd,t is the informed trader's intensity of trade. The informed trader's order submission is an increasing function of the difference between his assessment of the expected payoff and the current price. Given the linear strategy of the informed trader, the market maker observes the total order flow and awdjusts prices. Market efficiency (the zero profit condition) and the normality of the relevant variables imply dpd,t = Xdt dydt = Xdt(dXd,t+ dld t) X (6) where Xd,t is the sensitivity of the price to the order flow. 1/X1,t is a measure of market depth, because larger values of Xdt cause larger price adjustments for a given transaction size. The market maker learns from the net orders (dyd,t), so if the informed trader places large orders, the market maker learns about vd efficiently.
Given the linear strategies of expressions (5) and (6), Hd,t, the cumulative profit to the informed trader, follows the process I Using a limiting argument, Kyle (1985) shows that if prices are assumed to be linear, then the optimal strategies of the informed trader will be linear and vice versa. The sensitivity of the price to the orderflow (Xd) is constant through the day.
Theorem 1 shows that the sensitivity of the price to the order flow (Xd) increases with the amount of information released by the informed trader (2d -Ad) and falls with the amount of liquidity trading (o I). From the expression for fd,t, we know that the informed trader transacts more intensely when there are more liquidity transactions to disguise her trades. Also, the expression for Ydt implies that the informed trader releases her information smoothly through the day. Finally, the informed trader's profit (lld) increases with the amount of liquidity trading and the amount of private information released through trading each day.
Armed with this result, we consider how the informed trader transacts on different days of the week. More vigorous trade releases more information on that day, which lowers subsequent trading profits, while the public information release causes the private information to depreciate between days. As a result, the informed trader will not carry information forward unless it can be used more effectively in future trading. By computing the trading profits on different days, we characterize the informed trader's actions and the market depth during the week. Lemma 1 shows that the informed trader will avoid days when the market maker is more sensitive to changes in the order flow. Theorem 2 uses Lemma 1 to derive the interday differences in the amount of information released through trading and market depth (allowing for the existence of the quarterly report on some weeks). In the remainder of this section, we discuss Lemma 1, then introduce Theorem 2 and prove the theorem by construction. Finally, we derive the interday patterns in market depth and price informativeness when the daily public signal is noninformative (x 2 = 0).
To determine her optimal trading strategy, and hence the amount of information that will be released through trading, the informed trader compares her profit across days. Her total profit for day d 
2Xd+1
Given the initial information stock (rd), and the amount of information kept at the end of the next day's trading (Ad+l), the informed trader chooses the amount of information to be carried forward to tomorrow (Ad).
Using (9), the first-order condition for an interior Theorem 2 says that in the absence of a quarterly report, the amount of information released through trading and the market maker's price sensitivity parameter (Xd) decline monotonically over the week. For weeks with a quarterly report, more information is released through trading prior to the report. In this case, prices are more sensitive to the order flow prior to the quarterly report, and prices are less sensitive to the order flow after the quarterly report.
Assume that all information is exhausted by Friday close every week (A5 = 0). Next, suppose that Ad = 0 for all days. Then Theorem 1 implies that Xi = (3v2/v)1/2 and X2 = (E2/)1/2. However, by Lemma 1 this implies A1 > 0, which is a contradiction. Thus, it pays the informed trader to carry some of her information from Monday to Tuesday, because the market is deeper and yields higher expected trading profits on Tuesday. A similar argument holds for other days of the week. Now consider the informed trader's decision on Thursday. We know that some information is carried forward to Thursday (24 > r-2) and that the first-order condition is _1 + 1 ( a 2=-0. (14) is infinitely negative. Because the left-hand side of expression (14) is decreasing in information withheld on Thursday (A4), a unique solution exists. Also, as more information is carried into Thursday (24 increases), only a portion of it is withheld from trading (both A4 and 4 -A4 increase). Finally, more information is released through trading on Thursday than on Friday, so the price is more sensitive to the order flow on Thursday (i.e., 4 -A4 > 25, which implies X4 > X5).
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Continue the construction for the remaining days of the week, using the first-order condition from expression (11). By induction, we find X1 > X2 > X3 > X4 > X5 .
(15) Because X5 < Xl, the assumption A5 = 0 is verified and Theorem 2 is proved.
Finally, it is interesting to consider the case of a useless daily public signal (a2 = 00). In weeks without a quarterly report, the first-order condition for the informed trader is
Xd Xd+1 The optimal solution has the same price sensitivity to the order flow each day, Xd (5v 1) X(17) and the informed trader transacts so that she releases the same amount of information each day (ddAd is the same every day). In weeks with a quarterly report on day d, the informed trader exhausts her information through trading on day d because it will be useless after the quarterly report, so Ad The right-hand side of Equation (20) Theorem 3 states that when the public signal is useless, the variance of price changes is the same on all days. The reason for this is that if the information does not depreciate overnight, it pays for the informed trader to carry the information forward until the cost of exploiting the information is the same across days. Remember that the trading costs are related to the sensitivity of price to order flow (Xd), and that, from Theorem 1, Xd is a constant, and therefore the information revealed through trading each day (2d -Ad) is constant. However, with an informative public signal, the informed trader's information depreciates each day. Thus, the informed trader will carry forward her information only if price sensitivity to order flow is lower the next day (Xd+l < Xd). From Theorem 1, this implies that the variance of price changes falls through the week, and Monday has a larger variance of price changes than other days. Interday differences in the variance of price changes can be interpreted as a statement about the strength of the public reporting in the market. French and Roll (1986) They note that such a small ratio may result from the actions of privately informed traders. Our model is a rigorous version of their private-information hypothesis, and its predictions are consistent with their evidence.7 French and Roll (1986) use proportional returns to compute their ratios, whereas our model simply uses price changes. Foster and Viswanathan (1990) compute the French and Roll (1986) ratio using the variance of common stock price changes on the New York Stock Exchange in 1986. They show that while the ratio (in price changes or returns) can be sensitive to the time period considered, there are no significant differences in the estimates from the use of returns versus price changes.
In order to determine the parameter values that are needed to yield results that are consistent with the variance ratio observed by French and Roll (1986), Table 1 2;5a >_25b X with a strict inequality in weeks without a quarterly report. Also, the informed trader has higher profits with a 2
The Model with Discretionary Liquidity Traders
In this section, we examine the implications of allowing discretionary liquidity trading.9 The analysis is organized as follows. First, we compute expected net trading costs for the discretionary liquidity traders. Then, we determine a method for selecting the equilibrium trading pattern of the discretionary liquidity traders. This allows us to relate the actions of the discretionary liquidity traders to the quality of the daily public signal. We find that there are two days of concentrated trading when the public information is accurate (Theorem 5), andone day of concentrated trading when the public information is poor (Theorem 6). In Theorem 7 we show that discretionary liquidity traders will not trade on Monday if there is an informative daily public signal. Theorem 8 shows that the actions of the discretionary liquidity traders will determine the interday differences in trading volume. In addition, we provide numerical solutions to the model and examine the French and Roll (1986) ratio when there is discretionary liquidity trading.
Model description
In Section 1, liquidity traders did not recognize the informed trader's actions and simply traded when they experienced a liquidity shock. In practice, however, we expect that some liquidity traders will avoid days when the market maker is more sensitive to changes in the order flow. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that discretionary liquidity traders move to a single period, resulting in one period of concentrated trading. We allow discretionary liquidity traders to postpone their trades without cost by one calendar day, so that trades may be postponed within the week, but not over the weekend. Each discretionary liquidity trader is assumed to enter the market once a week, and must choose immediately whether to trade at the current time or trade the next day at the same time.10 For simplicity, we assume that all discretionary liquidity traders follow the same rule each day: either all shift or all stay. To further simplify our analysis, we assume that the quarterly report is made at the close of trading on a Friday.
Denote discretionary liquidity traders by the subscript c, and nondiscretionary liquidity traders by the subscript n. At each instant of time there is a nondiscretionary liquidity trader with an order of Un dnd,t and a discretionary liquidity trader with an order of ac dcd,t. We assume that instantaneous-order submission rates are independent. 
If a discretionary liquidity trader whose instantaneous order is oc dcd,t trades on day d, the net expected trading cost is -E[(Vd
Equilibria
In our model, a Nash equilibrium is a set of trading rules that is optimal for each trader when they take the others' best rule as given.12 We focus on Nash equilibria that are symmetric among discretionary liquidity traders. Because discretionary liquidity traders can trade immediately or postpone their transaction, they have two choices on each of four days, so there are 24, or 16, possible trading patterns (these are listed in Table 2 ). In this model, there may be more than one symmetric Nash equilibrium, so we develop a method for choosing among the possible Nash equilibria trading patterns. Before we discuss equilibrium trading by discretionary liquidity traders in detail, there are some straightforward results worth noting. First, if the daily public information is informative (af 2 oo), a constant level of orders from discretionary liquidity traders through the week is not a Nash equilibrium, because trading costs would decrease through the week, creating an incentive to delay trades. Second, if the public signal is useless (af = oo), then discretionary liquidity trading is futile. As in Section 1, the informed trader transacts so that information is released in proportion to liquidity orders submitted, which equalizes trading costs through the week. Thus, the decay of 
wEW d=1
An efficient equilibrium for a given set of model parameters must first eliminate trading patterns that cannot support a Nash equilibrium. Such patterns require discretionary liquidity traders to shift their trades in a manner that is inconsistent with the actions of the informed trader. From the remaining trading patterns, we choose the efficient trading patterns that are Nash equilibria and have the lowest costs for discretionary liquidity traders for the week, but these equilibria may not be unique.
To describe the efficient equilibrium trading patterns, we characterize the efficient equilibria for precise public information in Theorem 5, and the equilibrium for noisy (but useful) public information in Theorem 6. In Theorem 7, we show that efficient equilibrium trading patterns have no discretionary liquidity trading on Monday.
Theorems 5 and 6 show that the precision of the public information is a critical determinant of the equilibrium trading pattern. For accurate public information and the ability to delay trades by one day, the discretionary liquidity traders will find it optimal to cluster their trades on two separate days of the week, and they will not trade on Monday. That is, they move away from Monday, yet because the public information is very valuable, they pool their trades before the end of the week. In fact, with the ability to delay their transactions by one day, they find it optimal to pool their trades on two days of the week. For poor public information, the discretionary liquidity traders will not trade on Monday, and they only pool their trades on Friday.
Theorem 5. There exists a bound, 6, such that for all o2 < 6, any efficient equilibrium has With noisy public information, the informed trader has greater incentives to carry her information forward, requiring Xd > Xd+1, for d = 1, 2, 3, 4, and yielding concentrated trading on Friday and no discretionary liquidity trading on Monday. Theorem 7 demonstrates that when the daily public information is useful, an efficient equilibrium trading pattern has Monday discretionary liquidity traders moving to Tuesday. Intuitively, this shift occurs because there is more private information on Monday, making trading on Monday more expensive. Table 2 It follows that for any of the equilibrium trading patterns of Theorem 7, the scaled volume is the lowest on Monday. When the public information is very precise (low a 2), the informed trader trades so that the volatility of price changes on Monday is high. This is the opposite of Admati and Pfleiderer's (1988) model: they suggest that trading volume and the variance of price changes move together.
Theorem 7. Of the 16 trading patterns listed in
Numerical solutions
To illustrate the implications of the model, we solve it numerically for a variety of parameter values and compare the results to those of Table 1 . The parameters of the model are CT 2, 2 2, and C 2; only the relative noise of the daily public signal (C//oT) and the portion of liquidity traders that is discretionary (aT /CT ) are important in computing the equilibrium trading costs, volumes, and variances (they determine Ad/a 2). We fix a 2 at unity and vary the remaining two parameters_C 2 from 0 to 6 in unit intervals and C2/C 2 from 0 to 1 in intervals of 0.2 while keeping the total amount of liquidity trading constant at unity (i.e., C + n = 1.00) 13 We calculate efficient equilibria for each of the various parameter values. With poor public information and few discretionary traders, trading pattern 12 of Table 2 (0, 1, 1, 1, 2) is the efficient equilibrium.14 With precise information and many discretionary traders, trading pattern 14 of Table 2, (0, 1 Table 1 (without discretionary liquidity traders) the ratio did not fall to this level even with 2/C 2 = 20.00.
Alternative Specifications
In this section, we report numerical solutions of other specifications of the model. We alter the distribution of liquidity traders over trading days and reduce the amount of information accumulated over the weekend. For each of these trading scenarios, the basic results of Section 2 are unchanged. 
Initial distribution of liquidity traders
Interday variations in volume, costs, and variance depend, in part, on the arrival rate of liquidity traders. In this section, we consider equal arrival rates of liquidity traders and private information. Because we have assumed that the private information continues to arrive on the weekend and that there is no trading or public information made available at this time, there is an accumulation of three days of private information at the Monday open. Here, we assume that the liquidity needs of the uninformed traders follow the same schedule on the weekend as during the week, which results in liquidity orders on Monday at three times the rate of other days of the week (a 2= 3u 2). Without discretionary liquidity trading, the informed trader will release three times the information through trading on Monday; hence, the cost of trading is constant through the week, and the French and Roll (1986) ratio is 3.0, irrespective of the quality of the public information.
If we allow discretionary trading by a portion of the liquidity traders, introduction of three times as many liquidity traders on Monday as on other days has a significant effect on the French and Roll ( 1.00), the French and Roll (1986) ratio is much lower with the additional liquidity from the weekend (i.e., 0.4708, whereas in Section 2.4 it is 0.9492).
Private information accumulation over the weekend
Private information need not accumulate over the weekend at three times the weekday rate. Apart from agricultural commodities for which the weather plays a role, there seems to be no reason to exclude other accumulation rates. For the key results of our model, more information must accumulate over the weekend than on a weekday.
We repeat the calculations of Section 2.4 with a weekend information shock that is twice as large as the weekday shock. With a perfect daily public signal and no discretionary liquidity traders, a2/ a2 = 0.00 and a2/ra = 0.00, the French and Roll (1986) ratio is 2.00. Reducing the quality of the public information, so that U2/U2 = 6.00 and a 2/rf = 0.00, gives a French and Roll (1986) ratio of 1.2761. Finally, an increase in the number of discretionary liquidity traders to T/C2 = 6.00 and cT n= 1.00 gives a ratio of 0.7953.
By lowering the amount of information released over the weekend, the French and Roll (1986) ratio drops. However, the extent of the drop (the relative informativeness of Monday prices) is still strongly affected by the number of discretionary liquidity traders.
Summary
In this article, a model of weekly trading patterns in which differentially informed traders behave strategically is presented. First, we exclude discretionary trading by liquidity traders, assume that the informed trader receives information each weekday, and find that the informed trader has a greater advantage on Mondays. We also show that the informed trader's profits are affected by the quality of the daily public signal. Without public information, the informed trader carries information from Monday to other days, so that the sensitivity of the price to the order flow is the same every day. When there is an informative daily public signal, which causes the private information to depreciate overnight, the informed trader does not carry as much information across days; hence, more information is released through trading early in the week, and prices are less sensitive to changes in the order flow later in the week.
Second, we allow some liquidity traders to delay their trade without cost for one day, and vary the quality of the public information. In the absence of public information, we find that delay tactics by discretionary liquidity traders are futile, because the informed trader acts to ensure that trading costs are constant across days. With a highly informative public signal, the presence of discretionary liquidity traders yields an efficient equilibrium with two days of concentrated trading each week. With less valuable public information, Friday is the only day with concentrated trading. The implications of the model are that trading costs are highest on Monday and trading volume is low on Monday.15 Because the strength of these effects depends on the quality of the public information, we expect that the changes in the interday volume, trading costs, and the variance of price changes will be strongest for actively traded, high-profile firms. In addition, because more discretionary liquidity trading accentuates the interday variations, the volume effects should be more pronounced for block trades (since block traders are more likely to be sophisticated in their trading).16
Similarly, given the informed trader's trading rule fd,t, the market maker sets Xdt = 1d.tzd,t/l We show that only a constant Xd,t is possible in a Nash equilibrium.17 To do this, we first argue (by contradiction) that Xd,t must be strictly positive for a Nash equilibrium. This implies that Od,t is strictly positive. Next, we prove that these two conditions are sufficient to ensure that zd,t > 0 for a Nash equilibrium. Then we show that among all Lebesgue measurable functions, only a constant Xd,t can occur in a Nash equilibrium. Having done this, we solve for 3dt, which completes the proof.
If Xdt is negative or zero over a set of positive measure on [0, 1], then the informed trader sets d3t to be infinite in this region, and receives infinite trading profits. However, the market efficiency condition requires that a positive fd,t occurs with a positive Xd,t, which is a contradiction. Hence, Xd,t must be strictly positive in a Nash equilibrium.
Next, any Xd,t consistent with a Nash equilibrium must ensure that the optimal strategy for the informed trader has a strictly positive ddt and a strictly negative z 't. The strictly positive 3dt follows from Xd,t > 0 and the market efficiency condition. We prove that zd,t < 0 by contradiction. 
This series of inequalities uses the fact that in a Nash equilibrium the informed trader has at least one optimal strategy, where d,t is strictly negative. The inequalities imply that the informed trader has greater profits with the new strategy. Therefore, the optimal strategy must have z 't = 0 and fdt = 0 over the set A. The market maker would then set Xd,t = 0 in the set A, which contradicts our requirement that we contradict X, < X2. As a result, the trading pattern cannot be a Nash equilibrium. We use similar arguments for the remaining days and let v be the maximum of the v(6) corresponding to each day. To show that X5 < X, for any trading pattern with U2 = U2 + U, there is one day of the week such that Xd < Xd+l If A5 = 0, it is easy to show that X5 < Xl. If A5 > 0, then 1 -A1 increases and ; -A5 decreases, so X5 < X and A5 = 0, which is a contradiction. which is inconsistent with a Nash equilibrium. There are four trading patterns where Wednesday discretionary liquidity traders stay on Wednesday, and Thursday discretionary liquidity traders stay on Thursday (trading patterns 1, 5, 9, and 10 in Table 2 ). We eliminated trading pattern 1 in the prior paragraph. Compare trading pattern 10 (0, 1, 2, 1, 1) with trading pattern 14  (0, 1, 2, 0, 2 Second, we prove that these trading patterns, when they are equilibria, are dominated by trading patterns (0, 1, 2, O, 2), (0, 1, 1, 2, 1),  and (0, 1, 1, 1, 2) . We show that trading pattern (1, 0, 2, 0, 2) is dominated by (0, 1, 2, 0, 2) 
